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THE THIRD PARTY'S DILEMMA-THE EXCLUSIVE
LIABILITY DOCTRINE, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE,
AND THE MINNESOTA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT

I. INTRODUCTION

It has been 60 years since the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
legislature's constitutional authority to abrogate an employee's common law
right to sue his employer on account of job-related injuries and, within the
statutory framework of a system of workmen's compensation, to vest in the
employee, instead, an absolute right to be compensated by his employer for
those injuries.' Although the essential fairness and legality of the method by
which the workmen's compensation system allocates the costs and risks of
industrial injuries between employer and employee has long been recognized, 2 there exists an ever-widening controversy as to how these risks and
costs should be further allocated between the employer and third parties whose
conduct may have contributed to the employee's injury.
The controversy revolves around what may conveniently be referred to as
the exclusive remedy doctrine, a doctrine which has its origin in a statutory
provision3 common to most workmen's compensation acts. Its net effect is
to insulate an employer who has undertaken to pay compensation benefits
from any further liability to the employee and those claiming through him,
or, to use the statutory language, to "other persons," 4 on account of the
employee's injury. There is no longer any doubt that it is proper to deny to
the employee the right to sue his employer in exchange for the employer's
assumption of an absolute duty to compensate the employee for injuries

I. Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126 Minn. 286, 148 N.W. 71 (1914).
2. For a discussion of the economic advantages of the manner in which workmen's compensation allocates costs between the employer and employee, see G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACciDENTS 245-46 (1970). Simply stated, the costs of accidental injuries are reduced when losses are
imposed on employers without regard to fault since employers are better able than employees to
estimate accurately the costs of injuries and will adopt safety devices to reduce increased workmen's compensation costs. But cf. Sands, How Effective Is Safety Legislation? I I J. LAW &
EcON. 165, 177-78 (1968).
3. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1971).
4. Id.
The liability of an employer prescribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of
any other liability to such employee, his personal representative, surviving spouse,
parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to recover damages
on account of such injury or death. .. . Id. (emphasis added).
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sustained in the course of employment.' But what of the prejudice which
results to a third party, who is outside of the workmen's compensation
system and who has received no quid pro quo under the statutory scheme,
when the shield of the exclusive remedy doctrine is raised against him, after
he has been held liable to an employee in the latter's common law suit for
damages and seeks to recover by way of contribution or indemnity against
the negligent employer?
The Minnesota Supreme Court has had occasion to address itself to this
question in two recent cases in which it was first hinted," and then held,7
that a statute substantially extinguishing a third-party tortfeasor's right to
indemnity or contribution from a workmen's compensation employer
deprives the third party of due process of law and violates the state's constitutional guarantee that there shall be a remedy for every wrong.' As
expansive as these judicial statements might appear at first blush, a closer
reading of Carlson v. Smogarda and its express reaffirmation of prior case
law on the subject of employer liability to third persons discloses that the
court has retreated from the sympathetic position it had taken in Haney v.
InternationalHarvester Co.'" toward the plight of the third party and his
efforts to shift a portion of his liability for an employee's injury to the
negligent employer." In point of fact, considerably less has been accomplished in providing relief to the third-party tortfeasor than is implied by the
statement in Carlson that an otherwise "unrightable wrong" has now been
corrected." As was the case prior to Haney, the third party who is unable to
establish the existence of special, limited circumstances entitling him to
recovery of indemnity against the employer will continue to bear 100 percent
of a judgment entered against him in a common law action brought by an
employee even though his wrongful conduct, when compared to that of the
employer, was negligible or insignificant.
A change in the status of the third-party tortfeasor vis-A-vis the negligent
employer is needed, and the point which emerges most clearly from the recent
flurry of Minnesota case law is that any change must be effected by the
legislature. This same conclusion is reached by Professor Arthur Larson,
who describes the controversy as the most evenly balanced in all of com3
pensation law.'
5. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210
(1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
6. Haney v. International Harvester Co., 294 Minn. 375, 385, 201 N.W.2d 140, 146 (1972).
7. Carlson v. Smogard, - Minn. - ,215 N.W. 2d 615, 620 (1974).
8. MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
9. - Minn. - 215 NW.2d615 (1974).
10. 294 Minn. 375, 201 N.W.2d 140 (1972).
I1. Id. at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146.
12. - Minn. at - , 215 N.W.2d at 620.
13. 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS § 76.10 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
LARSON].
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II. THE THIRD PARTY'S DILEMMA-JUDICIAL
AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT

A. The Source of the Dilemma
Before embarking upon a more detailed discussion of the present status
of the law governing the third-party tortfeasor's recovery-over rights against
the negligent employer, and before considering the direction any legislative
action on the question should take, it is important to underscore the several
aspects of the compensation system which, in combination, form the basis
for the third party's dilemma.
The first important aspect of the system is that the employer's liability
under the Workmen's Compensation Act for injuries suffered by his employees while within the scope of their employment is exclusive to all other
liability. 4 The employer has no liability in tort to an injured employee. 15
The second pertinent feature of the compensation scheme is that the
employee ordinarily is free to pursue any remedies he has at common law
against third parties,"6 even though he may have received compensation
benefits from his employer. 7 In such actions, the third party may not raise
the employer's negligence as a defense, nor may he in most instances implead
the employer as a third-party defendent. s
Inter-woven with the employee's right to maintain an action for damages
against third persons who may have been instrumental in causing his injury
is the right of the employer, either independently or in conjunction with the
employee's action, to recover from third-party tortfeasors all compensation benefits which he was compelled to pay to his employee." Furthermore,
any amounts received by the employee in his common law action which
exceed the benefits previously paid out by the employer are available to the
employer as credits against future payments which he would otherwise be
obligated to make." As in the employee's action, the employer's negligence
may not ordinarily be asserted by the third party as a defense to the sub2
rogation claim .

1

14.

MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1971).
15. Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 374, 104 N.W.2d 843, 847
(1960).
16. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subds. 1-5 (1971).
17. The policy underlying the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation Act was the enlarge-

ment of the rights and remedies of the injured workman. See Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499,
507, 8 N.W.2d 808, 812 (1943), where the court, referring to a 1921 amendment of the compensation laws (Minn. Laws 1921 ch. 82, § 31), stated that the purpose of providing a workman a
cause of action against a third party who was negligent was the restoration of a remedy which
the worker had in Minnesota prior to the adoption of workmen's compensation.
18. See authority cited note 22 infra.
19. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subd. 3 (1971). See generally City of St. Paul v. Sorenson, 283
Minn. 158, 167 N.W.2d 17 (1969); Thibault v. Bostrom, 270 Minn. 511, 134 N.W.2d 308 (1965).
20. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subd. 6(d) (1971).
21. Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952).
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The final feature of the compensation scheme which bears directly on the
dilemma of the third-party tortfeasor is the judicial rule which, until 1969,
defined the narrowly restricted circumstances in which a third party had a
right to indemnity against a negligent employer after being held liable in
damages to an injured employee.22 In 1969, the Minnesota Legislature
enacted an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act 23 which went
even further in limiting those cases in which a third party could recover
against a negligent employer. It was this amendment which was held uncon24
stitutional in Carlson.
To highlight these aspects of the compensation system is to set out in sharp
relief the considerable disadvantage which the workmen's compensation laws
visit upon the third-party tortfeasor. Because the extent to which the employer's negligence caused the employee's injury cannot be litigated in the
employee's action against the third party, and because, in most situations, the
third party has no recovery-over rights against the employer, the third party
is struck a double-barrelled blow. First, his effort to spread the liability for
the employee's injury to the employer in proportion to the employer's negligence is thwarted. Thus, the third party must pay the full amount of the damages incurred, reduced only by the percentage of negligence assigned to the
plantiff-employee. Second, the employer or his insurer may recover through
subrogation all of the compensation benefits previously paid to the employee,
and the statutory liability for future benefits may be substantially reduced.
Since the employer's recovery is not reduced in proportion to his own negligence, the third party must subsidize the compensation system.
Moreover, there is some authority for the proposition that the employer
has an independent cause of action against a third party on account of injuries
sustained by his employee. 25The employer is said to have a right, independent
of his statutory subrogation rights, to recover from the third party the costs
incurred in compensating his injured employee.16 Such costs may include
increased insurance premiums resulting under retrospective premium rating
policies because of the adverse effect which a compensable injury has on the
employer's loss ratio.2 Exclusivity, thus, is not a two-way street. While the
22. These were the circumstances in Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn.
368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960).
23. Minn. Laws 1969 ch. 936, § 4, amending MINN. STAT. § 176.061 (1967) (codified at MINN.
STAT. §

176.061, subd. 10 (1971)):

If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by the employee, the employer, or
both jointly against the third person, results in judgment against such third person, or
settlement by such third person, the employer shall have no liability to reimburse or
hold such third person harmless on such judgments or settlements in absence of a
written agreement to do so executed prior to the injury.
24. - Minn. at,215 N.W.2d at 620.
25. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping Co., 394 U.S. 404 (1969), rev'g 392
F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1968), aff g 284 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
26. Id. See generally Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Employer's Independent Action
Against Third Party, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 223 (1970).
27. Contra, Northern States Contracting Co. v. Oakes, 191 Minn. 88, 253 N.W. 371 (1934).
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employee's remedies are limited to those afforded under the compensation
laws, the employer may have alternatives available to him beyond his statutory subrogation rights.
A system producing such results is a system gone awry. Assuming that any
accident reparations system should, on the one hand, be fair and just, and on
the other, reduce the costs of accidents," it is all too clear that the present
hodge-podge scheme for apportioning the costs of industrial accidents between employee, employer, and third party satisfies neither goal and should
be revamped.
In Haney, the court reflected upon the unfortunate circumstances of the
third-party tortfeasor under the compensation laws but failed to consider the
fundamental policy issue at stake in the third-party recovery-over problem.
Any precise solution must await a determination of whether the employer
should be stripped of the protection afforded him by the exclusivity doctrine
and in that manner subjected ultimately to greater liability to his employee
than that provided for under the compensation system. While that question is
wholly ignored in Haney, the Carlson opinion gives it perfunctory treatment,
stating that "no legitimate objective is fostered by preventing indemnification
to a third-party tortfeasor from a negligent employer." 9 The irony of the
Carlson decision lies in the fact that the court took one step forward in striking down the statute which expressly insulated an employer from liability to
the third-party tortfeasor, but then took two steps backward in gratuitously
upholding case law which would produce similar results and which had been
3 °
criticized by the Haney majority 1 year earlier.
B. JudicialA ttempts to Solve the Deepening Dilemma
1. The Status of the Law Priorto Haney
In Carlson, the 1969 amendment to the workmen's compensation laws
which had extinguished the right of a third party to recover contribution or
indemnity from an employer was declared unconstitutional, the court relying
on the objections first raised in Haney.3' The constitutionality of the 1969
amendment was not at issue in Haney, however.3 2 Rather, it was prior case

28. G. CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 24.
29. - Minn. at
- ,215N.W.2dat619.
30. For a similar judicial reaction to the plight of the third party, see McDonnell Aircraft Corp.
v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959); Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa.
454, 155 A.2d 836 (1959). In his concurring opinion in Brown, Jones, J.,
articulated his "sense of
unfairness" as follows:
While I believe that in the present posture of the law the result reached by the majority
of this Court is correct, yet I strongly believe that the result is inequitable and unfair.
The jury found Brown and Dickey equally liable to one injured person: under the result
reached Brown must pay in discharge of this equal liability more than 90% of the
amount of the verdict, a most shocking situation. 397 Pa. at 457, 155 A.2d at 840.
31. - Minn. at - ,215 N.W.2d at 618.
32. See text accompanying note 60 infra.
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law limiting third-party actions against employers which the Haney court
had challenged.33 Thus, an analysis of the two cases requires an understanding
of the manner in which the exclusive remedy doctrine was applied in Minnesota.
The interpretation given the exclusive remedy provision of the compensation law in Minnesota is representative of the approach taken by most jurisdictions. Prior to the 1969 amendment, it had long been the rule that under
certain limited circumstances, a third-party tortfeasor was entitled to relief
by way of indemnity 34 from a negligent employer. Thus, the court-made
exclusivity doctrine was not always an absolute bar to recovery against a
workmen's compensation employer. The application of this rule is no better
demonstrated than in Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co.3"
Hendrickson was an appeal by a defendent power company from the lower
court's order dismissing a third-party action for contribution or indemnity
which it commenced against the employer after being sued in a wrongful
death action brought by the trustee for the next of kin of the deceased employee. 6 The supreme court affirmed the lower court's order, but not without
indicating that in the appropriate factual setting a third-party tortfeasor
would be entitled to indemnity from a workmen's compensation employer for
37
damages it was compelled to pay to an injured employee.
The case contains two significant statements of workmen's compensation
law. The first is susceptible of brief exposition: an employer cannot be held
liable for contribution by a third-party tortfeasor who has been sued by that
employer's employee on account of injuries sustained on the job.3 An essential
element of an action for contribution is common liability between the party
seeking relief and the party sought to be charged. 39 Common liability, however, does not exist between the employer and the third-party tortfeasor.
Because the Workmen's Compensation Act abrogates the employer's tort

33. Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971); Lunderberg v.
Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954).
34. See notes 46-62 infra and accompanying text.
35. 258 Minn. 368, 104 N.W.2d 843 (1960). Hendrickson is widely cited as representing the
majority view on the issues raised in Haney. See generally Larson, Workmen's Compensation
Laws: Third Party's Action Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 351 (1970).
36. 258 Minn. at 369, 104 N.W.2d at 846. After her husband was electrocuted while moving a
house in the course of his employment, the plaintiff was paid workmen's compensation benefits.
In the subsequent wrongful death action, the defendant power company impleaded the employer
on the theory that the existing contract between it and the employer impliedly gave rise to a
promise by the employer to indemnify it for any damages resulting from the contract's breach.
37. Id. at 372, 104 N.W.2d at 848. After determining that the facts of the case did not bring it
within any of the five categories where indemnity was allowed, the court upheld the dismissal by
the lower court of the power company's third-party claim.
38. Id. at 372, 104 N.W.2d at 849.
39. Cf Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304,50 N.W2d
689 (1951); Parten v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 204 Minn. 200, 207, 283 N.W. 408, 412
(1938).
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liability,40 he cannot be considered a joint tortfeasor as to his employee.',
Even though the employer may have been negligent along with the third party
in causing the employee's injuries, and even though the third party may have
discharged more than his fair share of what might be considered their aggregate liability,42 an action for contribution does not lie. This, except in Penn45
sylvania,43 and possibly Rhode Island,4 4 is the universal rule.
The second principle of law to emerge from Hendrickson dealing with the
equitable remedy of indemnity and the circumstances in which this remedy is
available to a third-party tortfeasor against an employer is not as easily summarized. The court stated that there are five categories of cases in which such
relief is available: (1) where the indemnitee's liability is only vicarious or
derivative-as in the case where mere ownership of a motor vehicle has resulted in liability under the safety responsibility laws; (2) where the indemnitee has been held liable because of actions performed at the direction of the
indemnitor-as in the case of an agency relationship; (3) where the indemnitor's breach of duty owed to the indemnitee resulted in the indemnitee's liability to the third person-as in the case of the stevedore's duty to use due
care while working aboard ship; (4) where the indemnitee's liability arose
from his failure to discover the negligence of the indemnitor; and (5) where
6
there is an express indemnity agreement.1

40. 258 Minn. at 374-75, 104 N.W.2d at 848. Accord, Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild
Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144 N.W.2d 303 (1966); Husted v. Consumers Power Co., 376 Mich.
41, 135 N.W.2d 370 (1965); Young v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 Wis. 2d 36, 168 N.W.2d 112
(1969). See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
41. Keefer v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971).
42. The second element necessary for a contribution action is the payment of a disproportionate share of the liability by the party seeking relief. Bolles v. Boyer, 141 Minn. 404, 406, 170
N.W.229,230 (1919).
43. A peculiarity in Pennsylvania tort law allows an employer to be subjected to an action for
contribution to the extent of his workmen's compensation liability. Since Pennsylvania law only
requires joint negligence, it is possible for two parties to be joint tortfeasors even though they
have no common liability to the injured party. As a result, the exclusive remedy provisions of
Pennsylvania's workmen's compensation law are of no avail to the employer. Chamberlain v.
Carborundum Co., 485 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1973); Elston v. Industrial Lift Truck Co., 420 Pa.
97, 216 A.2d 318 (1966).
44. Two federal courts have intimated that Rhode Island would adopt the contrary rule. See
Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 809 (D.R.I. 1968), vacated. 419 F.2d 342
(lst Cir. 1969). Applying Rhode Island law, the trial court noted the lack of Rhode Island cases
on point and argued that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would choose this rule if presented
with the question. Although the court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment and applied
the majority rule, it did so on the theory that Rhode Island law, though it might follow the minority
rule, was inapplicable to the Federal Employees' Compensation Act claim before the court.
45. 2 LARSON§ 76.21.
46. 258 Minn. at 372, 104 N.W.2d at 848, citing Hanson v. Bailey, 249 Minn. 495, 83 N.W.2d
252 (1957) and RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUIoN § 76 (1937). In Hendrickson. the court described
indemnity as a remedy available to a party who had discharged a liability which more properly
and equitably should have been fully discharged by another. See Iowa Power & Light Co. v.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1974

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 4
COMP: THE THIRD PARTY'S DILEMMA

In discussing these five categories of cases, the court pointed out that
although indemnity is traditionally thought to spring from a contractual
relationship or a special legal relationship between the parties,47 the increasingly accepted view is that the remedy rests primarily on principles of
equity." The court's reliance on this equitable aspect of indemnity may
explain its willingness to find an implied non-contractual duty to indemnify in
situations where some jurisdictions deny recovery. 9 In this respect, the rule
is wider in scope in Minnesota than in those jurisdictions where the courts
insist upon a contractual relationship between the parties before permitting
indemnity. 0
In any event, Hendrickson stands for the proposition that a third-party
tortfeasor who can establish that his relationship with the workmen's
compensation employer falls within one of the five categories is entitled to be
indemnified by the employer. In those circumstances the exclusive remedy
provision of the compensation laws offers no shield to the employer for two
reasons. First, the original legislative intent that the Workmen's Compensation Act control only rights and liabilities as between the employer and the
employee5 means that the statutory "other persons" as to whom the employer's liability is exclusive do not include third-party tortfeasors.52 Second,
the employer's liability to the third-party tortfeasor does not arise "on
account of injuries" sustained by the employee, 53 but rather, on account of

Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 322, 144 N.W.2d 303,308 (1966), which, in cases of (1) express
contract; (2) vicarious liability; (3) breach of an independent duty; (4) active versus passive negligence, would permit indemnity.
47. E.g., Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 355, 63 N.W.2d 355, 360 (1954) (bailorbailee relationship). See also Baugh v. Rogers, 24 Cal. 2d 200, 215, 148 P.2d 633, 642 (1944).
48. 258 Minn. at 371, 104 N.W.2d at 847.
49. For arguments against implying such non-contractual duties to indemnify, see Royal
Indem. Co. v. Southern Calif. Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960); Forney,
Employers' Liability for Indemnity or Contribution, 34 INS. COUNSEL J. 362 (1967); authorities
cited note 115 infra.
50. More often than not, if the third party relies on an implied indemnity agreement as the
basis for his action, he will have to prove (I) that he is a party to an existing contract with the
employer; (2) that the employer has expressly promised to perform a service or task for the third
party; and (3) that the nature of the work to be performed necessarily requires that it be done in
a workmanlike manner using due care. See Forney, supra note 49, at 366-71.
51. 258 Minn. at 374, 104 N.W.2d at 849. See also Kipka v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 289 F.
Supp. 750 (D. Minn. 1968); Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 8 N.W.2d 808 (1943); Thorton
Bros. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5,246 N.W. 527 (1933).
52. Most of the workmen's compensation acts were drafted in the early 1900's, at which time
no thought was given to third-party actions per se. Therefore, the exclusive remedy provisions of
those acts should not be construed to apply to anyone other than the employee and those in
privity to him. Comment, The Right of a Third Party to Contribution or Indemnity from a
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Employer, 38 TUL. L. REv. 536, 538 (1964).
53. It is this nexus between the employee's injury and the "other person's" cause of action
which triggers the exclsuive-remedy provision. MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1971).
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the breach of a duty owed by the employer to the third party.54
Juxtaposed to Hendrickson and illustrative of the type of case in which
indemnity will be available to a third-party tortfeasor, is Keefer v. AIJohnson Construction Co.55 Keefer was an appeal from an order denying a new
trial in the suit of an injured employee against a third party. The third party,
a general contractor seeking indemnity, impleaded the subcontractor which
employed the injured party. The general contractor's third-party complaint
alleged that the subcontractor had breached its contract by failing to observe safety rules with respect to the equipment that it had furnished the
injured employee. At trial, the issue of the subcontractor's negligence had
been submitted to the jury along with that of the general contractor and the
employee. By special verdict, the jury attributed 28 percent of the total causal
negligence to the general contractor, 55 percent to the employer, and 17 percent to the plaintiff-employee. The court awarded the general contractor
indemnity against the subcontractor for the full amount of the judgment
recovered by the plaintiff against the general contractor."
The two primary issues on appeal were whether the exclusive remedy
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act protected the subcontractor
from liability to the general contractor and whether the trial court erred in
submitting the question of the subcontractor's negligence to the jury for
apportionment under the comparative negligence statute. 57 The court first
rejected the employer's contention that it was immune from suit, citing Hendrickson and subsequent cases.18 It also decided that the case was not governed by the 1969 amendment," since it had previously determined that this
particular amendment to the compensation laws was not to be applied retroactively.60 Indemnity was proper, stated the court, because the subcontractor's failure to provide safe equipment constituted active negligence,
while the general contractor was guilty only of passive negligence, and,
thus, the liability of the former was primary.6 Moreover, by providing the
employee with unsafe equipment, the employer exposed the general contractor to suit and thereby breached its contractual duty to protect the
62
general contractor from liability.
54. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956). Cf Burris v.
American Chickle Co., 120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941); McCross v. Ratnaker Shipping, 265 F.
Supp. 827 (D. Md. 1967); Trzos v. Berman Leasing Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 86, 229 N.E.2d 787
(1967); Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954); Merriweather v. Boland
& Cornelius, 6 N.Y.2d 417, 160 N.E.2d 717, 190 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959); Republic Steel Corp.
v. Glaros, 12 Ohio App. 2d 29, 230 N.E.2d 667 (1967).
55. 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971).
56. Id. at 97, 193 N.W.2d at 309.
57. Id. at98, 101, 193 N.W.2d at 309,311.
58. Id. at 100, 193 N.W.2d at 311.
59. Id. at 103, 104, 193 N.W.2d at 312.
60. Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 187 N.W.2d 689 (1971).
61. See 292 Minn. at 101, 193 N.W.2d at 311.
62. Id.
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Though Keefer is significant as an illustration of a situation in which an
employer is not immune from suit by a third-party tortfeasor, perhaps more
significant in the context of a discussion of the status of the law prior to
Haney is its resolution of the comparative negligence issue. The court took
the position that the trial court's submission of the issue of the employer's
negligence to the jury for apportionment under the comparative negligence
statute was improper. Without citation to prior cases, the court simply
stated that since "there was no common source of liability between the employer and the [third-party tortfeasor] ...there could be no issue of comparative negligence between them.""3 The court added that to permit apportionment of negligence by the jury would effectively render the remedy of
indemnity identical to that of contribution,6 4 a transmutation of the law which
it was not prepared to undertake. 5
In spite of the fact that the third party was successful in recovering indemnity against the employer, the Keefer decision, overall, must be considered adverse to the third-party tortfeasor's efforts to recover-over against
the negligent employer because of the court's refusal to bring the comparative
negligence statute to bear on indemnity claims. The third-party tortfeasor
will be given relief only if, as a matter of law, his involvement in causing the
injury was merely technical, constructive, or vicarious or if there is some
contractual or special legal relationship between the employer and the third
party which can be said to give rise to a duty to indemnify." Just as important, the third party is precluded from avoiding or minimizing his liability
to the employee by proving that the employer's negligence caused the plaintifrs injuries. 7 To admit such evidence, it is said, might seriously prejudice
6
the rights of the employee, contrary to the policy of the compensation laws. 1

63. Id. Since there was no showing of prejudice to the parties, the outcome of the case was not
affected. In ruling that the contractor was entitled to indemnity as a matter of law, the court
disregarded the jury's answers relative to the comparative fault of the parties.
64. Id. at 102, 193 N.W.2d at 312.
65. The court's reluctance to apply comparative negligence principles to indemnity actions reappeared in Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 208 N.W.2d 722 (1973).
66. See292 Minn. at 101, 193 N.W.2d at 311.
67. Nyquist v.Batcher, 235 Minn. 491, 51 N.W.2d 566 (1952). Apparently, even when the
action isbrought by the subrogated insurer and the employee is eligible to receive any excess
judgment, the same rule applies. Froysland v. Leef Bros., 293 Minn. 201, 197 N.W.2d 656 (1972).
Compare Froysland, supra, with Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1961) and Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co., 237 N.C. 559, 75 S.E.2d 768 (1953).
68. Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491,498, 51 N.W.2d 566, 571 (1952) ("The right of the employer, as a subrogee, to indemnification for his compensation liabilities is secondary, and the
assertion of his secondary right is no justification for seriously impairing the preferred status of
the employee or his dependents."). Accord, Sargent v.Axel H. Ohman, Inc.,
343 F.Supp. 316,
319 (D. Minn. 1972). The defendant attempted to join the employer in Sargent in order to have
the question of his negligence litigated. If successful, this would reduce the proportion of the verdict which would be recovered by the subrogated employer. The court, however, was fearful that
this
would confuse the jury and prejudice the employee's claim.
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This, then, in broad outline, was the status of the law with respect to thirdparty actions against employers when Haney was decided. Contribution was
never available to the third-party tortfeasor. Indemnity was permitted in
special instances where there was a contractual or legal relationship between
the parties which would provide the basis for a duty to indemnify and where
the employer sought to be charged was actively or primarily negligent and
the third party was only secondarily or passively negligent. In any event, the
issue of the employer's negligence could not be submitted to the jury. After
the 1969 amendment to the compensation laws, of course, the employer could
be held liable for indemnity only if he had entered into a written indemnity
agreement with the third-party tortfeasor prior to the injury to the employee.
2. The Adoption of ComparativeNegligence-Basisfor Change
Haney intimated a fundamental change in the law in Minnesota governing
the third party's right of recovery-over against the negligent employer. 69
The court expressed consternation at the fact that a third-party tortfeasor responsible only for 10 percent of the fault which caused an employee's
injuries could be required to pay 100 percent of the employee's judgment in a
common law action, while the employer, to whom 90 percent of the total
negligence was attributable, would avoid any liability on the judgment and
might even recoup all benefits previously paid to the employee. 0 Perhaps
motivated by the equitable maxim that one who has contributed to his own
loss ought not be granted a right of subrogation," the court seized upon the
adoption of comparative negligence as a possible basis for overruling prior
law and made sweeping pronouncements which could fairly have been interpreted as a preview of comprehensive future changes in the third party's
rights under the compensation laws.7"
Haney was a products liability action brought by a truck driver against
International Harvester for injuries arising out of a collision which resulted
when the truck he was driving went out of control. International impleaded the driver's employer as a third-party defendant.7 3 Since the accident
had occurred in April of 1969, International's third-party action against the
employer was not governed by the 1969 amendment.74 Prior to trial, the
69. The court, in Guillard v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20, 24 (8th Cir. 1973),
announced its belief that the Haney court had indicated its intention to change the rule precluding an indemnity action against a negligent employer. In so doing, it treated the issue in Guillard
as involving unformulated, rather than unclear, state law.
70. See 294 Minn. at 382, 201 N.W.2d at 144.
71. See Thorton Bros. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 246 N.W. 527 (1933); H. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY
§ 123 (2d ed. 1948).
72. See 294 Minn. at 382-87, 201 N.W.2d at 144-47.
73. Alleging that in failing to maintain and inspect the truck involved in the accident the employer was actively negligent, the third-party complaint sought relief by way of contribution or
indemnity.
74. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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employer successfully moved the court for an order dismissing the third-party
complaint on the ground that his liability on account of injuries to his employee was exclusively under the compensation laws. International
appealed.7"
In its opinion reversing the lower court's order, the supreme court first
noted that the dismissal of the third-party complaint was consistent with
Minnesota case law, if not actually required by a strict construction of the
exclusive remedy provision of the compensation statute." The court then
stated that with the adoption of comparative negligence,77 the time may have
come for a reconsideration of the rights of third-party tortfeasors vis-A-vis
negligent employers. Citing the "obvious unfairness" to a third party who
must bear the full weight of the employee's judgment when the overwhelming proportion of the negligence which caused the accident is attributable to
the employer," the court remarked in dictum that to deprive the third party
of his right to recover contribution or indemnity from a negligent employer
might constitute a denial of the due process of law. 0 In further dictum, the
court proposed that the unfairness to the third-party tortfeasor be mitigated
by permitting indemnity where there was a great disparity in the percentage
of fault attributable to the parties.81 Rather than deciding the issues presented
on the basis of the limited record before it, the court remanded the case for a
82
trial of all of the issues of law and fact.
Although Haney was the first case in which the court indicated its sympathy with the plight of the third-party tortfeasor under the workmen's
compensation laws, the opinion is remarkably devoid of any discussion of the
policy underlying the exclusive remedy doctrine, problems relating to insurance underwriting, or the comparative negligence statute. Therefore, one
might appropriately question the significance of the adoption of comparative
negligence and ask why the employer's immunity from suit should be lessened
merely because of a change in tort law. In answering this question, one of the
basic canons of compensation law must be remembered, i.e., the right to
proceed against a third party on account of job-related injuries is reserved for
the primary benefit of the injured employee and his dependents. 3 The

75. 294 Minn. at 376, 201 N.W.2d at 141.
76. Id. at 380, 201 N.W.2d at 143.
77. MINN. STAT. §604.01 (1971).
78. See 294 Minn. at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146.
79. Id. at 383, 201 N.W.2d at 145.
80. "With this in mind, there may be a due process violation when the third-party tortfeasor's
right to indemnity is extinguished by the Workmen's Compensation Clause without providing
him a reasonable substitute for his right." Id. at 385, 201 N.W.2d at 146.
81. Id.
82. Id. Prior to retrial, Haney was settled. For treatment of the issue by a federal court,
see Guillard v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1973).
83. Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491,498, 51 N.W.2d 566, 571 (1952).
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secondary subrogation rights of the employer s4 will not be permitted to prejudice or impair the employee's chance of a full recovery in a common law
action for damages against a third-party tortfeasor s5
The adoption of comparative negligence is significant because it permits
adjustments in the rights of employers and third-party tortfeasors without
sacrificing the rights of the injured employee and because it exacerbates the
inequity of the present system. Prior to the adoption of comparative negligence, the employee's contributory negligence was a complete bar both to his
recovery and to the recovery of a subrogated employer against a third party.80
Under comparative negligence, however, such contributory negligence is a
bar to recovery only if the employee's negligence is the same as or greater
than that of the third party." In other words, the statute increases the third
party's vulnerability in actions brought by an injured employee or the subrogated employer or insurance carrier.
A similar change is wrought with respect to the contributory negligence of
of the employer. Under the former system, the employer's contributory
negligence was a bar to recovery against the third party in those cases where
the employee stood no chance of benefiting from the employer's recovery. 8
Under comparative negligence, the employer is permitted to recover so long
as no more than 49 percent of the negligence causing the injuries for which he
was compelled to pay benefits is attributable to him.8 9 Again, the third party's
liability is increased.
Moreover, comparative negligence permits a reconciliation of two conflicting principles of compensation law which otherwise provide the grist for a
substantial amount of confusion and litigation. The first of these principles,
the primacy of the employee's rights under the compensation system, has
already been alluded to. 0 The second principle is that the compensation laws
are not intended to control rights and liabilities between employers and third
persons .91
When applied, the first principle conflicts with the policy underlying the
second, for in favoring the rights of the employee and preventing the third
party from litigating the question of the employer's negligence, the compensation system does, in fact, limit the right of the third party to shift some

84. Id. The secondary right referred to is the employer's or insurer's right of subrogation as set
forth in MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subds. 6-7 (1971).
85. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
86. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Schulte Realty Co., 210 Minn. 235, 297 N.W. 718
(1941): Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Minnesota Util. Co., 207 Minn. 24, 289 N.W. 782 (1940).
87. MINN. STAT.§604.01 (1971).
88. See Nyquist v. Batcher, 235 Minn. 491,498, 51 N.W.2d 566, 571 (1952).
89. MINN. STAT.§604.01 (1971).
90. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
91. Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 374, 104 N.W.2d 843,
846 (1960).
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of the burden of the employee's common law judgment against him onto the
negligent employer. Comparative negligence may offer a solution to this
conflict. At the very least, it allows for the apportionment of negligence between all of the parties, whether they are actively involved in the litigation or
not.92 Any negligence assigned by the jury to the employer can form the basis
of an offset against the employer's portion of the employee's common law
recovery.93 No prejudice would result to the employee since it is only that portion of the judgment earmarked for the employer that is reduced.
Paradoxically, then, the adoption of comparative negligence could facilitate the correction of a long-standing injustice in the compensation system or
serve as the vehicle for the visitation of further inequity upon the third-party
tortfeasor. Since the outcome depends upon the judicial response to the adoption of the statute, the supreme court's wisdom in urging a reexamination of
the rights of the third-party tortfeasor vis-iA-vis the negligent employer is
apparent.
3. The Court Declines to Effect Radical Change
It is somewhat anti-climactic that Haney effected no actual change in the
law governing the third party's right to recover indemnity or contribution
from the employer. Even if the court had elected to decide the issue which had
been presented on appeal, instead of remanding the case for a trial in the
lower court, the 1969 amendment to the compensation laws, which was not at
issue in the case,94 would have continued to insulate the employer from liability to the third-party tortfeasor in the absence of a written indemnity
agreement. Therefore, after 14 months of confusion in the trial courts and
several conflicting federal court interpretations of the status of Minnesota
law, 95 the court was asked, in Carlson v. Smogard," to give relief to the third
party and to clarify the dicta of Haney.
The construction and constitutionality of the 1969 amendment was
squarely at issue for the first time in Carlson. The case reached the supreme
court on an appeal from the trial court's order dismissing the third-party
complaint of Smogard against the plaintiff's employer.97 Since the plaintiff's
92. See notes 150-163 infra and accompanying text.
93. See notes 150-163 infra and accompanying text.
94. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subd. 10 (1971) did not take effect until September 1, 1969, 5
months after the accrual of the cause of action in Haney. Thus, International Harvester's right
of recovery-over was governed by the case law interpreting MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1971).
95. Guillard v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1973); Leppala v. Sawbill
Canoe Outfitters, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 409 (D. Minn. 1973).
96. - Minn. - ,215 N.W.2d615 (1974).
97. Id. An employee of Quality Mercury sued Smogard after the hood on Smogard's automobile flew open while the employee was test driving it. In his third-party complaint against
Quality, Smogard sought indemnity or contribution on the ground that Quality had breached
warranties made to Smogard at the time of his purchase of the vehicle from them. Smogard also
sought indemnity on the grounds that Quality had been actively negligent while his own negligence had been only passive.
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cause of action had arisen after 1969, the subsequent third-party action
against the employer was correctly held by the trial court to be governed by
the 1969 amendment.

98

By-passing entirely the earlier suggestions that the common law rules
governing the remedy of indemnity be changed so as to give relief to the beleagured third-party tortfeasor, the court instead ruled that the legislature
could not properly deprive a third party outside of the workmen's compensation system of his common law remedy without providing a substitute remedy. 99 The 1969 amendment was therefore held to violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and article 1,section 8,
of the Minnesota constitution."'0
It is worth noting that no cases are cited in direct support of the court's
holding on the constitutional issue. In point of fact, every other case to
address the issue has held the contrary.101 One circuit court of appeals easily
disposed of the constitutional issue by saying that it had no doubt but that a
state legislature has the constitutional power to insulate an employer from all
liability beyond that imposed by the compensation laws, including liability to
a third person seeking contribution or indemnity, even though so to do might
cut across equitable considerations.10
This same approach was recently taken by the federal court for the district
of Minnesota in a case which rejected out of hand the dicta in Haney.1°" Expressing wonder that the Minnesota Supreme Court could posit a due process
problem concerning the application of the statute, the court wrote: "Nowhere
does the Constitution provide that common law judicial decisions are property
rights or are guaranteed to continue, unchanged, fixed, and unaltered."' 14
98. See Id. at
,215 N.W.2dat 618.
99. Id.__ 215 N.W.2d at 620.
100. Id.
101. Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1955); Leppala v.
Sawbill Canoe Outfitters, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 409 (D. Minn. 1973); Coates v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co.. 95 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1951), motion to amend original third-party complaint
denied. 96 F. Supp. 1019; Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144
N.W.2d 303 (1966): McCain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 153 So. 2d 124 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (statute
providing that workmen's compensation remedy is exclusive does not violate due process). In
none of these cases were the courts presented with the question of whether comparative
negligence would dictate a different resolution.
102. Hill Lines, Inc. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 222 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir. 1955). In
most instances, the due process claim has been rejected on the theory that the third party's cause
of action for indemnity or contribution is not a "vested right." E.g., Coates v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 95 F. Supp. 779, 783 (D.D.C. 1951), motion to amend original third-party complaint
denied, 96 F. Supp. 1019. In Walters v. Blackledge, 220 Miss. 485, 498, 71 So. 2d 433, 446
(1954), it was stated by the court that "it is manifest that there can be no vested right in a cause
of action which has not yet come into being." In Mathison v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 126 Minn.
286, 291, 148 N.W. 71, 73 (1914), the Minnesota court similarly stated that a person does not
have a vested interest or property right in a "rule of law."
103. Leppala v. Sawbill Canoe Outfitters, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 409 (D.Minn. 1973).
104. Id. at 412.
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If the decision in Carlson is contrary to the weight of authority, the result
nevertheless might be explained by the Minnesota constitutional provision
upon which the court relied in part in invalidating the statute and which guarantees a remedy in law for every wrong.1 5 While no federal due process violation may result from the rigid application of the exclusive remedy doctrine,
there may, in fact, be a denial of the state constitutional guarantee to the
extent that the equitable remedies of contribution or indemnity are "remedies under the law.'""
Concern over the validity of the court's constitutional argument may be
academic, for Carlson effected little real change. Though it invalidated the
1969 amendment, the Carlson court perpetuated the dilemma of the thirdparty tortfeasor by expressly reaffirming the prior Minnesota case law as set
forth in Hendrickson.0 7 Thus, if the Haney case were again before the trial
court on a motion to dismiss the third-party complaint, Carlson would require the granting of the motion. 8 While the Carlson opinion does not expressly foreclose the possibility raised in Haney of creating a new category of
cases where indemnity is permitted, the court's current position is probably
best indicated by a case decided shortly before Carlson in which it announced
its adherence to the Hendrickson categories and its preference for limiting
indemnity actions to those "rare cases" in which the parties seeking indemnity have been guilty of no active negligence. 09
4. Carlson: A Critique
The attempt to solve the third party recovery-over problem must be
regarded as wholly inadequate. Not only does it leave the minimally culpable
third-party tortfeasor bearing 100 percent of an employee's judgment, a
.totally inequitable consequence, but the purported solution is conceptually
defective as well. The rule developed in the case law and approved in Carlson
bars third-party actions for contribution because of the absence of common
liability between employer and third-party tortfeasor,"O but permits recovery
in indemnity by a passively negligent third-party tortfeasor against an
actively negligent employer, exclusive remedy doctrine notwithstanding.'
The conceptual difficulty lies in the fact that the tortfeasor's negligence whether "active" or "passive"" ' 2 must be determined in light of the
duties he owed to the injured employee, rather than in terms of the duties he
105. MINN. CONST. art. 1, §8.
106. See id.
107.
- Minn. at
215 N.W.2d at 620.
108. In Haney the supreme court indicated that the third-party tortfeasor was unable to
establish a right to idemnity under one of the five theories set forth in Hendrickson. 294 Minn. at
380, 201 N.W.2d at 143.
109. Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 208 N.W.2d 722 (1973).
110. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text.
I ll. Hendrickson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 258 Minn. 368, 373, 104 N.W.2d 843,
848 (1960).
112. E.g., the mere failure to discover the negligence of another.
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might have owed his fellow tortfeasor. ' 31 This, in turn, means that there must
have been a common liability between the two tortfeasors."4 Yet, where this
common liability is abrogated by a statute such as the Workmen's Compensation Act, and where as a result the employer has no liability in tort to the
injured employee, the basis for indemnity withers away."'
It may be argued that no such incongruity exists and that the right to indemnity between the active and passive tortfeasor springs not from some
mutual relationship of the tortfeasors to the injured party, but from a legal
relationship inter se in which the duty to indemnify is implied as a matter of
law." 6 According to this rationale, the implied duty to indemnify over-rides
the exclusive remedy provision of the compensation laws." 7
In taking this approach, however, the Minnesota court would adopt a rule
which has been rejected in many jurisdictions." S At the theoretical level, it is
113. See authorities collected notes 115-117 infra.
114. See authorities collected notes 115-117 infra.
115. Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915.
Writing for the majority in Slattery, Learned Hand, J., stated:
[Wie shall assume that, when the indemnitor and indemnitee are both liable to the
injured person, it is the law of New Jersey that, regardless of any other relation between
them, the difference in gravity of their faults may be great enough to throw the whole
loss upon one. We cannot, however, agree that that result is rationally possible except
upon the assumption that both parties are liable to the same person for the joint wrong.
If so, when one of the two is not so liable, the right of the other to indemnity must be
found in rights and liabilities arising out of some other legal transaction between the
two. Id. at 139.
Accord, Crawford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1953); Husted v. Consumers
Power Co., 376 Mich. 41, 135 N.W.2d 470 (1965); Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Calif.
Petroleum Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960); Forney, Employers' Liabilityfor Contribution or Indemnity, 34 INS. COUNS. J. 362 (1967).
116. Cf. Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296 Minn. 298, 208 N.W.2d 722 (1973); Larson v. City of
Minneapolis, 262 Minn. 142, 148, 114 N.W.2d 68, 73 (1962); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 140 Minn. 229, 231, 167 N.W. 800, 801 (1918).
117. See generally Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956);
Whitmarsh v. Durastone Co., 122 F. Supp. 806 (D.R.I. 1954); San Francisco Unified School
Dist. v. California Bldg. Maint. Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958);
McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959).
Ryan is a landmark case involving maritime law and the Longshoreman's Act. It was an action
against an employer-stevedoring company brought by a shipowner who had previously been
compelled to pay damages to an employee of the stevedoring company because of an injury
sustained by the employee while performing certain work on the ship. The United States
Supreme Court held that the shipowner was entitled to indemnity from the stevedoring company
because of the latter's breach of its implied contractual obligation to the shipowner to perform
its work properly and in a workmanlike manner. The willingness of the court to permit tort-like
damages to be recovered against the negligent employer can only be seen as a willingness to
equate the breach of the duty owed by the employer to the third-party tortfeasor with a breach of
warranty. See Larson, supra note 35, at 411.
118. See generally United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 951; Halliburton Co. v. Norton Drilling Co., 302 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1962),petition
for rehearing denied, 313 F.2d 380 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951; Slattery v. Marra Bros.,
186 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915; Iowa Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr.
Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144 N.W.2d 303 (1966); Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151
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argued that an implied legal duty to indemnify is far too broad a tort duty
upon which to base a cause of action which is impervious to the employer's
exclusive remedy defense. "9 The practical difficulties of the rule are demonstrated most graphically in a recent Minnesota case in which the court was
finally compelled to answer the question of whether indemnity lies where
liability is merely vicarious, where the relative culpability of the parties; conduct is disparate, or where the active-passive dichotomy is applicable, by
saying that "[N]o one has come up with a complete answer and we will have
to permit indemnity on a case-by-case basis where our sense of fundamental
fairness seems to require it."'o
The conceptual problem is further illustrated by the efforts of the Minnesota court to apply tort-like language and measures of damages to actions for
La. 41, 46, 91 So. 539, 541 (1922); Baltimore Transit Co. v. State, 183 Md. 674, 39 A.2d 858
(1944), affd, 184 Md. 250, 40 A.2d 678 (1945); Royal Indem. Co. v. Southern Calif. Petroleum
Corp., 67 N.M. 137, 353 P.2d 358 (1960); Algrem v. Nowlan, 37 Wis. 2d 70, 154 N.W.2d 217
(1967); Engel v. Bindel, 27 Wis. 2d 456, 134 N.W.2d 404 (1965).
In Iowa Light & Power Co., the injured employee brought an action against the power company for failing to move its power lines after having been notified that construction work was
to be done in the area. It sought contribution or indemnity from the employer who had negligently failed to see to it that the lines were moved before sending its employees to work. The
power company argued that its negligence was merely passive while that of the employer was
active and that the employer had breached certain duties owed to the power company. The
Iowa court held that the breach of duty argument must fail because of the absence of common
liability and added that appellant power company's reliance on the active-passive dichotomy as
creating a special duty between two tortfeasors is too broad to serve as a basis for permitting
indemnity. 259 Iowa at 326, 144 N.W.2d at 311.
Similarly, Engel v. Bindel notes that the relationship between two strangers whose negligence
has combined to cause injury to one person is not one of the special legal relationships which
warrants an action for indemnity. The Wisconsin court stated:
[W]e have concluded the legislature intended to limit the liability [of the employer] in
exchange for his absolute liability under the Workmen's Compensation statute. If the
liability of the employer is to be extended beyond the limits intended by the legislature,
it should not be by a legally implied agreement to indemnify. 27 Wis. 2d at 458, 134
N.W.2d at 407.
119. In Pachowitz v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Co., 56 Wis. 2d 383, 202 N.W.2d
268 (1972), the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined an invitation to base the availability of indemnity upon a distinction between active and passive negligence. The court could not justify
requiring an actively negligent tortfeasor to whom five percent of the causal negligence was
attributable to pay all of the judgment, while excusing from liability the passively negligent tort2d 273, 226
feasor responsible for 95 percent of the negligence. Contra, Miller v. DeWitt 37 II1.
App. 2d 38, 208 N.W. 249 (1965); American
N.W.2d 630 (1968), affg in part, rev'g in part, 59 I11.
Dist. Tel. Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950). The federal court's construction of Iowa
law in Kittleson is strongly criticized by the Iowa Supreme Court in Iowa Power & Light Co.
v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144 N.W.2d 303 (1966). See Kentucky Util. Co. v. Jackson
County Rural Elec. Coop., 438. S.W.2d 788 (Ky. App. 1969); 2 LARSON § 76.44.
120. Hillman v. Wallin - Minn. __ ,215 N.W.2d 810 (1974). See Leflar, Contribution
and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130, 147 (1932) ("The allowance of indemnity is based altogether upon the law's notion-influenced by an equitable backgroundof what is fair and proper between the parties.")

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol1/iss1/4

18

et al.: The Third Party's Dilemma: The Exclusive Liability Doctrine, Comp
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

indemnity, actions which are essentially ex contractu.2' While these efforts
may spring from the court's sense of "fundamental fairness," '22 confusion
and inconsistency are the net result. As Dean Prosser has noted, it is virtually
impossible to predict, in those jurisdictions which permit indemnity actions
by passive wrongdoers against active wrongdoers, whether relief will be
granted in a particular case.'23 Ultimately, the question resolves itself into an
inquiry as to whether in the opinion of the community,justice is served by imposing the responsibility for the accident upon one party rather than the
other.24
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the reasoning in Haney regarding
the due process issue was lost on the majority in Carlson, thus giving rise to a
second conceptual problem. While citing Haney in support of its position on
the constitutional issue, the Carlson majority apparently failed to recognize
that the constitutional attack launched in Haney was aimed as much at the
case law exemplified by Hendrickson as at the 1969 amendment.2 5 It is
remarkable that the case law so severely criticized in Haney should be
gratuitously approved in Carlson. As one federal district court pointed out,
there was in reality no applicable common law rule to affirm, the previous
cases having been so vehemently rejected in Haney that a court-made void
existed with respect to the question. 26
III. AN ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In light of the adoption of comparative negligence in Minnesota and the
opportunity which it offers for ameliorating the present prejudice to the thirdparty tortfeasor, the questions raised in Haney, but forgotten in Carlson,
must be resurrected. Since apportionment of the negligence of all parties is
possible under comparative negligence, no prejudice can result to the employee, and the primary policy reason for withholding from the jury all evidence relative .to the employer's negligence is overcome.'27 The added advantage in litigating the issue of the employer's negligence is that the sum
121. In the active-passive case where indemnity is said to be proper, the action sounds in
breach of contract. The contract is one implied at law under the terms of which the actively
negligent tortfeasor is deemed to have promised to indemnify another tortfeasor whose negligence is merely passive.
122. Hillman v. Wallin, __ Minn. - ,215 N.W.2d 810,813 (1974).
123. W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OFTORTS §48 (3d ed. 1964).
124. Id.
125. This conclusion is in accord with a federal court's interpretation of Haney. In Guillard
v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 488 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1973), confronted with the precise issue
which had been treated in Haney, the court noted that Haney was addressed to the inequitable
results often obtained in applying the Hendrickson rule.
126. Id. at 24.
127. Professor Larson has observed that a solution to "this most evenly balanced of controversies" is difficult to reach within the context of the common law which requires that total
victory be granted either to the plaintiff or the defendant. The very essence of comparative
negligence, of course, is that such "total victory" is no longer required. 2 LARSON § 76.22.
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which the third-party tortfeasor would otherwise be obligated to pay to the
subrogated insurer can, as a result of the apportionment of negligence of all
parties, be reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence assessed to the
employer. This latter result remains true to the inviolable equitable principle
that the employer should not be permitted to profit from his own wrong by a
recovery against a third-party tortfeasor where it was the employer's conduct
which occasioned the employee's injury.""
The obvious response to any suggestion that the doctrine of comparative
negligence be used to adjust the liabilities of employer and tortfeasor is that
which was raised in Keefer'29 and later in Froysland v. Leef Bros. 130 Since
there is no common source of liability between the employer and the third
party, the argument goes, there can be no comparison of fault.' This response, however, does not flow from a conflict between the policies underlying the exclusive remedy doctrine and comparative negligence, but is rather
a technical argument premised on certain legal fictions resorted to by courts
in permitting contribution between joint tortfeasors. 1 2 It is these same legal
fictions which the Haney court suggested should be abandoned if continued
adherence to them would perpetuate unfairness and injustice to the third
party. 3
The invalidation of the 1969 amendment is merely the first step toward
resolving the third-party tortfeasor's dilemma. The second step, as Professor Larson has indicated,' 3 must be taken by the legislature, for even the
most imaginative and comprehensive of judicial efforts to effect a change will
result in only stop-gap measures. An example in support of this proposition
may be found in the Haney case itself.
A. Haney Proposals: Inadequate
a solution to the third party recovery-over problem
that
Haney suggested
might lie in the establishment of a new category of cases in which indemnity
would be permitted: those in which there is a gross disparity in the degree of
fault attributable to the parties.3 5 All things considered, the court in Carlson was wise in bypassing this proposal. Where would the line be drawn in
determining whether a "gross disparity" exists? Would indemnity be permitted if the disparity is 90 percent to 10 percent? Why, then, not where it is
128. See Thibault v. Bostrom, 270 Minn. 511, 134 N.W.2d 308 (1965), where the employer
was allowed subrogation under the Workmen's Compensation Act because the third party's
negligent conduct had necessitated the payment of benefits to the employee.
129. 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971).
130. 293 Minn. 201, 197 N.W.2d 656 (1972).
131. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
132. See 294 Minn. at 383, 201 N.W.2d at 145.
133. Id.
134. Grede Foundries, Inc. v. Price Erect. Co., 38 Wis. 2d 502, 157 N.W.2d 559 (1968); 2
LARSON § 76.53.
135. 294 Minn. at 385-86, 201 N.W.2d at 146.
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85 to 15 percent? More important, how can a rule permitting indemnity between joint tortfeasors be upheld while contribution, under the same circumstances, is disallowed? Far from abolishing legal fictions, creating a new category of cases where indemnity is permitted would necessitate engrafting a
new legal fiction into the law of indemnity-a promise implied at law by the
one substantially at fault to indemnify one whose fault is minimal. 36 Beyond
these considerations, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of adequately framing
the issue in an instruction for submission to the jury may in itself be sufficient
37
reason for rejecting the suggestion.
The doctrine enunciated in Keefer and Froysland forbids apportionment of
the fault of the employer, the employee, and the third-party tortfeasor under
the comparative negligence statute'38 and gives rise to a fourth reason for rejecting the court's proposal. Since the issue of the employer's negligence cannot be submitted to the jury, there would be no mechanism available for
determining the percentage of total fault attributable to him, a determination essential to the question of whether he is under a duty to indemnify the
third party.
The court's proposals in Haney are symptomatic of the problem at the
heart of the third party recovery-over controversy. Because of the oxclusive
remedy provision of the compensation laws, the employer cannot be held
liable in tort to the third party. Therefore, in strained efforts to do justice,
courts have sought to give the third party relief by dressing his remedies in
contractual trappings. In the case of the actively negligent employer and the
passively negligent third party, for example, the courts find an "implied contract" between the two parties that each will use due care so as not to subject
the other to liability by causing injury to an employee. The breach of this
implied contract, say the courts, gives rise to yet another implied contractual
arrangement, a promise made by the actively negligent employer to indemnify the passively negligent third party.
If it is necessary to operate within the theoretical confines of a contractual
relationship existing between the employer and the third party, adjusting the
relative rights of parties whose fault contributed to the employee's injuries
within the framework of tort principles such as contributory and comparative
negligence becomes a Herculean task. 39 Moreover, the advantages accruing
from the application of the contract fiction may be illusory. If, in the end, the
claim for indemnity brought by the third party against the employer arises
"on account of" the employee's injury or death, and not on account of the
136. See id. at 382-83, 201 N.W.2d at 145.
137. As one commentator has asked in his criticism of the gross-disparity-in-fault basis for
awarding indemnity: how would an instruction to the jury be framed to identify with sufficient
clarity the point at which the relative disparity in the gravity of the faults becomes great enough
to justify indemnity? Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A ProposedRationale,
37 IowA L. REV. 516 (1952).
138. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
139. Larson,supru note 35, at 380.
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separate contractual obligation running from the employer to the third party,
the exclusivity doctrine cannot be avoided.4 0
B. The Alternatives
Even if the proposals voiced in Haney had been adopted by the Minnesota
Supreme Court, the third-party tortfeasor would continue to bear an often
disproportionate share of the responsibility for compensating injured workmen. It is just as inequitable that a third party to whom 30 percent of the
total fault giving rise to the injury is attributable pay 100 percent of the
judgment obtained by the employee as it is that one to whom 10 percent of
the negligence is attributable should bear the total liability. Thus it is
necessary to turn to possible legislative approaches to solving the dilemma of
the third-party tortfeasor.
1.A New Definition for "Other Persons"
One proposal for change that might be suggested is an amendment of
Minn. Stat. § 176.031 to exclude from the category of "other persons" third
parties who have been sued by injured employees and who then seek relief
against the negligent employers. Additional language might appropriately be
added to the statute, stating that for the purposes of a third party's claim for
relief, the employer may be considered a tortfeasor as to his injured employee. The amendment would not alter the employer's immunity from direct
suit by the injured employee.
The effect, however, would be to open the flood-gate of claims for indemnity and contribution against the employer, and the employer's protection against double liability to his employee would be completely emasculated. Since the employer has surrendered his common law defenses to
claims for work-related injuries and has agreed to pay benefits to his injured
employee up to a maximum limit without regard to fault, to impose upon him
additional liability to his employee by compelling him to contribute all or
part of a judgment entered against the third-party tortfeasor would deprive
the employer of the quid pro quo for his concessions and subvert the basic
premise of the compensation system. "' The unfairness of permitting the employee to recover indirectly from his employer sums which the exclusive
remedy doctrine would forbid him to recover directly is apparent.'
140. MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1971) provides: "The liability of an employer prescribed by this
chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other liability to such employee ... on account of
such injury or death." (emphasis added).
141. Cf 2 LARSON§76.52.
142. Reed v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 175 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.H..1958).
The p9licy of this law would be circumvented if the employee may obtain a possibly
largerv,erdict from a third party, and if the third party is permitted to obtain indemnity
from the employer. The result would be that the employee might ultimately obtain
on account of his injuries an amount from his employer larger than that recoverable
under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Id. at 410.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol1/iss1/4

22

et al.: The Third Party's Dilemma: The Exclusive Liability Doctrine, Comp
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. I

Therefore, while it might readily be agreed that the negligent employer
should not be permitted to escape all financial responsibility while the third
party, in effect, pays the compensation bill, stripping the employer of his
protection from indirect tort liability to his employee merely substitutes one
injustice for another. The 1969 Minnesota Legislature addressed this very
problem when it enacted Minn. Stat. § 176.061, subd. 10, in an attempt to
guarantee that the employer would not be subjected to double liability on
account of an employee's injury. Based upon this legislative expression of
public policy with respect to third-party recovery-over rights, it is
undoubtedly a fair assumption that the Legislature would take similar action
again in 1975 but for the constitutional limitations disclosed in Carlson.
2. An Upper Limit on Employee's Recovery Against Third Parties
Limiting the right of the employee to sue negligent third persons or setting
upper limits on the damages recoverable from the third party might afford
another avenue of relief. Other states have experimented with such a solution. In Illinois at one time, an employee could not bring an action against a
third party if that party were an employer or employee covered by the state's
compensation scheme. " 3 This scheme, known as a "family" system of
compensation,' has been struck down in every jurisdiction which has
implemented it on the grounds that it unconstitutionally denies the employee
his right of action against third persons who have caused his injuries. 145
In Minnesota, a variation of the "family" type of compensation scheme is
embodied in the election of remedies provision of the Act.'46 Although the
provision, on its face, would appear to provide considerable protection to the
third-party tortfeasor who is also an insured employer pursuant to the Act,
the supreme court has construed the provision in such a way that the employee is put to an election in only an extremely limited number of cases. 47
Since the Legislature has had ample opportunity to amend the election provision, it must be assumed that it has acquiesced in the strict construction
143. ILL. LAWS 1913, P. 335 §§3, 30 (repealed 1959).
144. See Comment, The Right of a Third Party to Contribution or Indemnity from a
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Employer, supra note 52, at 556.
145. Grass v. Dealers' Trans. Co., 412 I11.179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952). See 2 LARSON § 72.40.
146. MINN. STAT. § 176.061, subd. 1 (1971) provides:
Where an injury or death for which compensation is payable occurs under circumstances which create a legal liability for damages on the part of a party other than
the employer and at the time of such injury or death that party was insured or selfinsured in accordance with this chapter, the employee, in case of injury, or his dependents, in case of death, may proceed either at law against that party to recover
damages or against the employer for compensation, but not against both.
The election must be made only when the third party is insured or self-insured and engaged in
the due course of business with the injured employee's employer "in furtherance of a common
enterprise" or in "the accomplishment of the same or related purposes in operation on the
premises where the injury was received .... " Id. at § 176.061, subd. 4.
147. Cf Urbanski v. Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 239 Minn. 63, 57 N.W.2d 686 (1953);
Gleason v. Geary, 214 Minn. 499, 8 N.W.2d 808 (1943).
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given to the statute by the supreme court. "' One factor no doubt at work is
the Legislature's view that the statutory compensation scheme, standing alone,
frequently provides inadequate benefits to reimburse the injured employee
for his damages.' The likelihood, therefore, is that reform will not consist of
restrictions upon the employee's right to maintain a common law action
against a negligent third party.
3. Limiting Employer's Subrogation Recovery
Even though affirmative relief cannot be provided to the third-party tortfeasor by permitting him to recover contribution from a negligent employer
and even though the right of the employee to bring an action against third
parties is to be preserved intact, the vulnerability of the third-party tortfeasor can be lessened by limiting subrogation rights. This solution would
require two changes in present law. First, Minn. Stat. § 176.061 should be
amended to provide, in effect, that in any action by the employee against a
third person, that third person may join the employer so that the negligence
of all those involved can be apportioned by the jury. This amendment would
pave the way for the second change in the law, a reversal of the rulings in
Keefer v. AlJohnson Construction Co.' and Froysland v. Leef Bros. 511 that
the negligence of a compensation employer may not be apportioned under the
comparative negligence statute.
That a finding of negligence on the part of the employer would not render
him liable directly to the employee should not preclude submitting the issue
to the jury. In Wisconsin, the issue of all parties' negligence is submitted even
though the plaintiff may not, in fact, be able to recover against all of the
defendants because of a personal defense available to one or more of them.
Wisconsin's practice is best illustrated in Pierringerv. Hoger,5 2 where one of
two joint tortfeasors had entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiff. The settling tortfeasor's negligence was submitted to the jury even
though he would not be liable to the plaintiff on any judgment entered in the
plaintiffs favor. 53 This procedure is consistent with the proposition that the
actual participation in the negligent causation of an injury-not legal responsibility to compensate-is the criterion by which the statutory proportion of the plaintiffs contribution to his own injury should be determined. 54
148. Cf Harvest Queen Mill & Elevator Co. v. Sanders, 189 Kan. 536, 370 P.2d 419 (1962);
In re Bordeaux, 37 Wash. 2d 561, 225 P.2d 433 (1950); State v. Surma, 263 Wis. 388, 57
N.W.2d 370 (1953).
149. See THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS 53-75 (1972).
150. 292 Minn. 91, 193 N.W.2d 305 (1971).
151. 293 Minn. 201, 197 N.W.2d 656 (1972).
152. 21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106(1963).
153. Id. at 183, 124 N.W.2d at 108.
154. Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934). See
Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence-Problems of Theory and Special Verdict
Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REV. 293 (1970).
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This reasoning requires that the negligence of the employer be submitted
to the jury, since he is a person whose negligence may have contributed to the
employee's injury. The fact that he may not be a sueable tortfeasor is immaterial. His culpability in causing the employee's injury is material, how5
ever, since he should not be permitted to benefit from his own wrong.1
Therefore, if the question of his negligence is submitted to the jury, the share
of the employee's overall recovery to which he would otherwise be entitled by
reason of his subrogation rights can be reduced in direct proportion to the percentage of negligence attributable to him. Moreover, a finding that the
employer was causally negligent will reduce proportionately the credits otherwise available to him with respect to future benefits due to the employee.15
In practice, these results could easily be accomplished by permitting the
third-party tortfeasor to join the employer or his insurer as an involuntary
plaintiff in the employee's suit. Such a procedure, although rejected in dicta
in one Minnesota case, 157 is in accord with the applicable rules of court'56 and
was expressly sanctioned in a federal case dealing with an employer's subrogation rights under Minnesota compensation laws. 151
It might be noted that the procedure suggested here is identical to the
minority rule on the subject of contribution actions followed in Pennsyl155. See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
156. Assume that employee brings an action against third party and that third party, in turn,
joins employer as an involuntary plaintiff. Employer has paid benefits under the compensation statute in the amount of $3,000.00. The jury returns a verdict in the amount of $21,000.00
and finds that 80 percent of the total fault was attributable to the employer and 20 percent was
attributable to the third party. Under the proposed system, the proceeds of the judgment would
be distributed as follows:
Judgm ent ........................................................................
........ $2 1,000 .00
A ttorneys' fees: ...................................................................... $ 7,000.00
Em ployee's 1/3: ..................................................................... $ 4,666.66
Em ployer: ............................................................................. $ 600.00
Balance (to em ployee): ............................................................. $ 6,333.34
If the employee were otherwise entitled to additional payments after the date of judgment, the
third party would, in effect, be subrogated to the employee's rights and would receive payment
directly from the employer on the basis of 80 percent of the employee's weekly benefits.
Payments to the third party would continue until a total of $4,877.20 had been paid (80 percent
of $6,333.34). Then, payments would be made to employee. Of course, the third party would
be entitled to no reimbursement from employer unless the employee were entitled to benefits
under the various provisions of the compensation laws.
157. Froysland v. Leef Bros., 293 Minn. 201, 205-06, 197 N.W.2d 656, 660 (1972). The
holding in Froysland appears to stand for the proposition that a third-party tortfeasor's rights
are not prejudiced in a subrogation action brought by a workmen's compensation carrier merely
because the court excludes evidence tending to show concurrent negligence on the part of the
employer. However, this must be regarded as dicta, since the court's refusal to name the employer as an involuntary plaintiff was based on the workmen's compensation carrier's agreement
to be bound by the results of the employee's suit. Therefore, there was no possibility that the
third-party tortfeasor would be subjected to a multiplicity of suits.
158. MINN. R. Civ. P. 17, 19.
159. Braun v. Hassenstein Steel Co., 21 F.R.D. 343 (D.S.D. 1958).
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vania.'61 Described by some commentators as a "credit concept of contribution,"'' it requires the third party to pay the entire damage award, less the
compensation benefits for which the employer is liable under the statute, in
the event that both the employer and the third party are found to be at fault
62
in causing the employee's injuries.
The procedure outlined here would provide only partial relief for the thirdparty tortfeasor. He would continue to bear the burden of satisfying in full
that portion of the negligence award recoverable by the injured employee
rather than by the subrogated employer or insurer, notwithstanding the fact
that the causal negligence of the employer far exceeded that of the third
party. This result is justifiable on the theory that the injured employee's
rights are primary under the compensation scheme and must be protected
even at thq cost of inequity to other involved parties. 6 3 The positive feature of
the plan, however, is that the negligent employer and his insurer could no
longer compel the third party to reimburse them where, but for the compensation laws, the negligence of the employer would defeat the recovery against
the third party. This improvement in the position of the third party may be
achieved without sacrificing the goals of the compensation system, since the
rights of injured employees are in no way impaired by an adjustment of the
employer's subrogation rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The task of equitably allocating the cost of industrial accidents between
the injured employee, his employer, and the third-party tortfeasor is not a
,simple one. The difficulty arises, in large part, from the necessity of reconciling two essentially divergent accident reparation systems: workmen's
compensation, in which the fault of the employer and employee is irrelevant,
and the tort system, in which liability is intricately intertwined with culpability. These differing bases of liability give rise to practical problems at the
juncture of the two systems, and the consequent subsidy of the compensation
system by third-party tortfeasors undermines the goals of reducing the costs
of accidents and achieving justice. Not only is the subsidy intuitively unjust,
but it also conflicts with a basic premise of the workmen's compensation
scheme, that the employer, due to his degree of control over on-the-job safety,
is the most efficient bearer of the costs of industrial accidents.'
Unfortunately, the third party's dilemma is not susceptible of easy resolution. The alternatives of permitting unlimited contribution and indemnity
claims by third-party tortfeasors against negligent employers and of limiting
160. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
161. See Comment The Right of a Third Part to Contribution or Indeninit, Front a
Louisiana Workmen's Compensation Eniplo'er, supra note 52 at 557.
162. See, e.g., Maio v. Fahs. 339 Pa. 180. 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
163. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 2 supra.
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the injured employee's right to recover against a negligent third party may
65
meet the cost allocation goal but fall far short of achieving the justice goal.
The solution recommended here attempts no more than a rough accommodaton of the two systems. It seeks modest advancements toward the achievement of both goals without sacrifice of either.
The premise underlying the proposed solution is a simple one. If the third
party is to incur liability on account of his negligent conduct, all negligent
conduct going to cause the injury, including that of the employer, should be
presented to the jury for assessment and comparison. By this means a larger
portion of the costs of industrial accidents may be placed upon compensation
employers through proportionate reduction of their subrogation recoveries,
resulting, at least in theory, in a more efficient allocation of costs. On the
other hand, the extent of the third-party tortfeasor's subsidy of the compensation system is reduced.
While the solution recommended here can be reconciled with both the
workmen's compensation and tort systems, a more comprehensive rearrangement of the compensation scheme is required to resolve fully the third
party's dilemma, if, indeed, a complete resolution can ever be effected
without unduly prejudicing the other involved parties. At the very least, such
fundamental change can be undertaken only after a legislative determination
of priorities. Only a reassessment of the purposes of the workmen's compensation and tort systems and an evaluation of the purposes they are designed
to serve can form the basis for their eventual reconciliation.
165. See text accompanying notes 141, 142, and 149 supra.
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